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THEY DID IT BEFORE, THEY MUST HAVE DONE IT
AGAIN; THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S PROPENSITY TO
USE A NEW ANALYSIS OF 404(B) EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, federal agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) conducted an investigation into a cocaine distribution ring op-
eration in Chicago and Milwaukee.1  The agents suspected Nicolas
Gomez of involvement.2  As part of their investigation, agents placed
a wiretap device on the phone of a known Chicago drug supplier,
Robert Romero, which, in turn, revealed the name of the reseller,
“Guero,” who lived in Milwaukee.3  In fact, the cell phone number
Guero used was registered to a residence in Milwaukee, which is
where Gomez and his brother-in-law, Reyes, lived.4  After several
months of monitoring, federal agents determined a transaction pattern
whereby Romero and Guero arranged a cocaine sale over the phone.
GPS data then tracked Romero’s trips from Chicago to an alley be-
hind Gomez’s house.5
Finally, federal agents saw their chance to catch the conspirators in
the act on September 2, 2010, when Romero and Guero discussed a
sale for the next day.6  The agents followed Romero as he drove from
Chicago to Milwaukee and parked his car on a side street very near
Gomez’s residence.7  The two men had a brief conversation next to
Romero’s car and then left the scene on foot going in opposite direc-
tions.8  Unfortunately, for Gomez, his course took him past the DEA
agents who pretended to be part of an antigun task force and stopped
him to ask questions about his identity.9  The phone number Gomez
gave was the same number that Guero  previously used that day to
arrange the sale.10  The agents watched as Gomez then got into a
1. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 850–51.
7. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 851.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
1055
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green minivan, picked up Romero several blocks down, and drove to a
nearby restaurant where they met Reyes, Gomez’s brother-in-law.11
After their meeting, the three men went their separate ways.12
Reyes left driving a tan colored Suburban, which was stopped and
identified by a DEA agent.13  “Gomez and Romero must’ve been
spooked” because neither of them returned to Romero’s car.14  In-
stead, Romero took a lengthy cab ride back to Chicago.15  Later that
day the agents seized Romero’s car—which was still parked where he
had left it—and found a quarter kilogram of cocaine in the trunk.16
Phone calls from that evening and the next morning revealed Romero
and Guero frantically reviewing the events of the day.17  During the
calls, Guero stated that police stopped his brother-in-law while he was
driving away, which was exactly what happened to Reyes.18  Guero
also stated that the police had stopped him while he was walking to his
car, which was precisely what happened to Gomez.19  About four
weeks later, DEA agents arrested Gomez at his home, and, while con-
ducting a search, they found a small quantity of cocaine in a pair of
pants that were found in Gomez’s bedroom.20
During his trial, “Gomez’s defense was mistaken identity—he . . .
was . . . in the wrong place at the wrong time[,]” and, instead, it was
Reyes who was Romero’s coconspirator.21  Using Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b)(2), the government introduced the small amount of co-
caine found in the pants that were discovered in Gomez’s bedroom at
the time of his arrest to evidence Gomez’s identity as Guero.22  The
trial court admitted the evidence, and the jury ultimately convicted
him on all counts.23  Gomez appealed his conviction, challenging the
admission of the other act evidence.24  The Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, found the evidence “extremely weak” but ultimately affirmed
his conviction.25  In doing so, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 851.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 851.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 852.
22. Id. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
23. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 852.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 864.
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changing the existing case law regarding Rule 404(b) evidence, which
created an entirely new game for proponents of this evidence.26
Rule 404 is sometimes referred to as the “character rule.”27 How-
ever, this title is misleading, and it is very important to understand
how this Rule actually works before proceeding further.28  Rule 404
has two subparts, (a) and (b), and each have separate purposes.  Gen-
erally, Rule 404(a) bars evidence of a person’s character that shows
that on a particular occasion, the person acted in accordance with the
character or trait.29  However, this type of evidence is admissible in a
criminal case, and Rule 404(a) lays out who may offer it.30  Rule
404(a) works in conjunction with Rule 405(a), which provides that evi-
dence of a person’s character may only be offered through reputation
or opinion.31  On the other hand, Rule 404(b) discusses the admission
of evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts that prove a relevant issue
of the case.32  Therefore, calling Rule 404 the “character rule” is a
misnomer, because Rule 404(a) is the only part that deals with charac-
ter evidence, whereas Rule 404(b) deals with evidence relating to an
element of the charge.33  The prosecution in United States v. Gomez34
sought to introduce the evidence of the cocaine to establish an ele-
ment of the charge: Gomez’s identity.35
The evidence in Gomez was impermissible propensity evidence36 in
disguise—a product of the misapplication of multipart tests for admis-
sibility.37  In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit noted: “Especially in
drug cases like this one, other-act evidence is too often admitted al-
most automatically, without consideration of the ‘legitimacy of the
26. Id. at 853 (reasoning that the test for evaluating the admissibility of evidence was no
longer useful and introducing a different approach for clarity).
27. See generally THOMAS A. MAUET & WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE 75–123 (5th
ed. 2012) (discussing the two character trait rules under Rule 404 and 405: the essential element
rule and the circumstantial evidence rule).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See generally MAUET & WOLFSON, supra note 27. R
34. 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
35. Id. at 852.
36. Throughout this Comment the term “propensity evidence” is used alongside of “character
evidence.” However, these two should not be confused because character evidence refers solely
to evidence of a person’s character, while propensity evidence takes it one step further and
suggests that because the accused has a particular character trait, she most likely acted on that
character trait again and committed the alleged offense.  Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Charac-
ter Rule in American Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L. REV. 775, 778 (2013).
37. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 853.
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purpose for which the evidence is to be used and the need for it.’”38
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is the most cited Rule of Evidence,
demonstrating its complexity and difficulty in applying a proper analy-
sis at the trial level.39  The prosecution, particularly in drug cases,
overwhelmingly uses this rule.40  Additionally, cases have also over-
whelmingly demonstrated the misapplication of the Rule, prompting a
need for a change.41
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit changed the law in
both United States v. Miller42 and Gomez by creating a rules-based
framework for the admissibility of other crimes evidence under Rule
404(b), which differs from the former checklist test.  The rules-based
approach is more appropriate because the former checklist test tended
to support a mere automatic admission of other crimes evidence.  The
new test refocuses the issue on relevancy by conflating Rules 402 and
403 with the requirement that the proponent articulate a relevant pur-
pose for the evidence.  Although the new test ignores the “sole pur-
pose” standard derived from Huddleston v. United States,43 the rules-
based approach nonetheless reflects the concerns and protections
presented in Huddleston.  Thus, just as the Third Circuit has already
done, all of the federal circuit courts of appeals should adopt this test
to promote uniformity, efficiency, and fairness in deterring propensity
evidence, and, in addition, this rules-based approach should be modi-
fied to begin with the “sole purpose” standard to better ensure funda-
mental fairness.
Part II of this Comment explores the background of Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b) in the U.S. legal system, including its current use
and understanding.44  Part III argues that the Seventh Circuit has
changed the existing law regarding the admissibility of Rule 404(b)
evidence in Miller and Gomez.45  Part III also explores why the previ-
ous checklist test is no longer applicable, and why the new rules-based
framework is more appropriate.46  Part IV examines the impact the
38. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2012)).
39. Ashley Hinkle, Comment, Every Consumer Knows How To Run a Business: The Danger-
ous Assumptions Made When a Prior Possession Conviction Is Admitted as Evidence in a Case
Involving Commercial Drug Activity, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 401, 405 (2015).
40. Id. (noting that on appeal, Rule 404(b) is the most challenged evidentiary rule, illustrating
the continued misapplication of the rule).
41. Daniel P. Ranaldo, Note, Is Every Drug User a Drug Dealer? Federal Circuit Courts Are
Split in Applying Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 147, 149 (2014).
42. 721 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2013).
43. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
44. See infra notes 49–208 and accompanying text. R
45. See infra notes 209–40 and accompanying text. R
46. See infra notes 241–292 and accompanying text. R
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new test will have, particularly in regard to circuit uniformity, and the
reliance on limiting instructions.47  Part V concludes that the new test
advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Gomez has changed the way all
courts will analyze the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b),
and although the test is still within the broader holding of Huddleston,
it should still include the sole purpose test.48
II. BACKGROUND
The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by order of the U.S.
Supreme Court on November 20, 197249 and became effective July 1,
1973.50  The rules were enacted to govern the admission of evidence
for the U.S. district courts in trial proceedings.51  Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404 (Rule 404) regulates the admissibility of evidence relating
to a person’s character.52  Subsection 404(a) addresses conformity
with an individual’s character traits,53 while Subsection 404(b) ad-
dresses the admission of crimes, wrongs, or other acts (other crimes
evidence) for limited purposes that bear on relevant issues of a
crime.54  This Comment focuses on Rule 404(b) other crimes evidence
and will begin with: (1) a brief history of the origins of the character
evidence rule through England and into U.S. law;55 (2) the modern
application of this rule as applied in United States v. Huddleston;56 (3)
how the federal courts followed the Huddleston analysis;57 (4) the crit-
icism received by the modern application of the rule;58 and, lastly, (5)
the rationale for the exclusion of other crimes evidence in criminal
trials.59
47. See infra notes 293–354 and accompanying text. R
48. See infra notes 355–57 and accompanying text. R
49. 8 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 3 (7th ed. 2014).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FED. R. EVID. 404.
53. Id. at 404(a).  Rule 404(a) is not applicable to civil cases. Id. at 404 advisory committee’s
note to 2006 amendments. Id. at 404.
54. Id. at 404(b).  Thus, it is important to understand the differences between Rule 404(a) and
Rule 404(b). See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text (describing these differences).
55. See infra notes 60–124 and accompanying text (providing a brief history of the character R
evidence rule as it developed in England and then into law in the United States).
56. See infra notes 125–46 and accompanying text (providing an example of the modern appli- R
cation of this rule as seen in Huddleston v. United States).
57. See infra notes 147–57 and accompanying text (explaining how the federal circuit courts R
have followed the modern application of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Huddleston).
58. See infra notes 158–78 and accompanying text (detailing the criticism that the modern R
application of the rule by the federal courts has received).
59. See infra notes 179–240 and accompanying text (explaining why it is necessary to have a R
rule that excludes this evidence in a criminal or civil trial).
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A. Origins of the Character Evidence Rule
Because most of U.S. law is rooted in English law, it is helpful to
understand the use of other crimes evidence in the English courts.60
As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand Rule 404(b) as
a rule of either exclusion or inclusion.61  Professor David Leonard
suggests: “This dichotomy between a rule of exclusion with narrow
exceptions and a rule of admission with a single exception is not
merely one of form.  It is important analytically because the way the
rule is formulated will often affect the outcome of particular admissi-
bility questions.”62  The exclusionary form of the rule excludes all evi-
dence suggesting propensity except evidence that is admissible to
prove a relevant issue of the crime (e.g., intent, motive, or knowl-
edge).63  On the other hand, the inclusionary form admits all evidence
that is relevant except evidence that suggests propensity.64  As Part
II.B. demonstrates, it is important to keep these formulaic distinctions
in mind when analyzing courts’ recent interpretations of an admissibil-
ity test for this kind of evidence.65
1. Rule Development in England
The first rule relating to admission of character and other crime evi-
dence “appeared in English courts during the Restoration Period and
around the same time as the hearsay rule.”66  By the beginning of the
nineteenth century, a rule against evidence relating to character was
established in England;67 however, a rule concerning other crimes evi-
dence had not yet been formulated.68  Prior to the mid-nineteenth
century, the cases show that courts followed a more inclusionary ap-
proach.69  The inclusionary form presumed that the other crimes evi-
dence was admissible as long as the evidence was relevant for more
than the forbidden propensity purpose, that is, to show the defendant
was more likely to commit the crime.70
60. DONALD P. LEONARD, THE WIGMORE A NEW TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENCE OF
OTHER MISCONDUCT AND SIMILAR EVENTS § 2.1, at 19 (Richard D. Friedman ed. 2009).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 2.1, at 18.
63. See id. § 2.1.
64. Id.
65. See infra notes 125–46 and accompanying text.
66. Milich, supra note 36, at 777.
67. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 2.1, at 18.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 3.2, at 75.
70. Hinkle, supra note 39, at 404. R
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During the mid-nineteenth century, however, English courts pre-
ferred an exclusionary form.71  The exclusionary form presumed “that
evidence is inadmissible unless it is relevant for a specific purpose.”72
The U.S. courts initially adopted the inclusionary form due to the mis-
taken belief that it was the English common law rule.73  In both coun-
tries, literature mischaracterizes the issue as one of categorization by
type of case and purpose for which the evidence is offered, instead of
seeking an articulated, unifying theory through which other crimes ev-
idence can be admitted or excluded.74  Unfortunately, because of the
lack of a unifying theory, this “has led the courts to approach the
problem from a pigeonholing perspective rather than from standards
that would emerge from an analysis of the relevance of this type of
evidence, the probative value of the evidence, and the dangers such
evidence poses.”75  As a result, courts struggled to properly apply an
appropriate test, which was carried over to early American law.
2. Rule Development in the United States
In the United States, the development of rules governing the admis-
sion of other crimes evidence was similar to the development in En-
gland.76  Like England, early U.S. courts also excluded any evidence
of uncharged misconduct.77  Early U.S. courts clearly relied on the
English commentators and typically cited to English cases in their
opinions and decisions.78  Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, U.S.
courts, similar to English courts, recognized a rule of inclusion, admit-
ting any uncharged misconduct evidence unless it was used to estab-
lish character conformity.79  Then, around 1850, U.S. courts began
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 404–05.
74. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 2.2, at 19.
75. Id. § 2.4.3, at 72. Throughout this Comment the terms “other crimes” and “uncharged
misconduct” are frequently used. “Other crimes” refers to previous convictions, while “un-
charged misconduct” refers to offenses for which the defendant was never formally charged and
may include arrests for such offenses.
76. Id. § 3.1.
77. Id.  Julius Stone, a leading scholar in this area, explained that there was a common belief
among judges and text writers, which has rarely been questioned since it began around 1850, that
in the beginning the law said no similar facts would be admitted.  “So great, runs the thought,
was the solicitude of the common law to avoid damning the accused with prejudice, diffusion,
and confusion of issues that, however relevant and on whatever issue, similar facts and, above
all, similar bad acts of the accused were never admitted.” Id. § 3.1, at 74 (quoting Julius Stone,
The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 989 (1938)).
78. Id. § 3.1. See generally id. § 3.2 (providing an analysis of early U.S. commentators and
their development).
79. Id. § 3.2, at 75.
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using an exclusionary form of the rule with narrow exceptions.80  The
trend that developed during this time was that the courts were willing
to allow the introduction of uncharged misconduct evidence when it
was most needed, for example when the accused denied knowledge of
a material fact and the uncharged misconduct proved he had prior
knowledge of that particular fact.81  As courts asserted the need for
this evidence, however, they typically began their analysis by recogniz-
ing the “fundamental ban on the use of character as circumstantial
evidence of conduct.”82  This type of evidence was offered for both
civil and criminal cases, and it was offered for the same purposes (i.e.,
for instance to prove relevant issues in the case, such as the necessary
state of mind).83  In their analysis, the courts looked to the type of
action of the uncharged misconducted and the purpose for which it
was offered.84
3. People v. Molineux
The language used in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) can be
traced back to an early New York case,85 People v. Molineux.86 Moli-
neux involved a prosecution for the homicide of Katherine Adams, a
New York City resident.87  The alleged culprit sent a bottle of Bromo
Seltzer medicine laced with cyanide and mercury to Harry Cornish,
the Athletic Director of the Knickerbocker Athletic Club.88  Cornish
took the bottle home and offered it to his landlady, Katherine Adams,
who was complaining of a headache.89  She became deathly ill from
the medicine and immediately died after taking it.90  Previously, that
Fall, a bottle of the same medicine was sent to Henry A. Barnet, a
member of the same athletic club.91  He took the medicine to cure an
upset stomach and became deathly ill.92  Barnet died within two
weeks of consuming the same rare poison that killed Katherine Ad-
80. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 3.1, at 74.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 3.1, at 75 (emphasis added).
83. Id. § 3.3, at 101.
84. Id.
85. Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b),
78  TEMP. L. REV. 201, 202 (2005).
86. 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
87. Reed, supra note 85, at 202.  This case summary is derived from Reed’s account. See id. at R
202–03  See Molineux, 61 N.E. at 286, for the full case and text.
88. Reed, supra note 85, at 202 (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 287).
89. Id. (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 287).
90. Id. at 202–03 (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 287).
91. Id. at 203 (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 289–90).
92. Id. (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 289–90).
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ams.93  Roland Molineux, a chemist, had motive to kill both “Barnet
and Cornish: Barnet for trying to [steal] Molineux’s fiance´” and “Cor-
nish for crossing him at various club events.”94  During Molineux’s
trial for the death of Katherine Adams, the prosecution introduced
other crimes evidence, including evidence that he was the likely per-
petrator in Barnet’s death.95  Molineux was convicted, and he ap-
pealed.96  His appeal was successful, and he was acquitted on retrial
during which no facts regarding the the Barnet killing were admitted
into evidence.97
On appeal, Judge William E. Werner produced a general rule for
the admission or exclusion of other crimes evidence.  Judge Werner
wrote: “The general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is
that the state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged
in the indictment, either as a foundation for a separate punishment, or
as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged.”98  How-
ever, Judge Werner then went on to state that, in general, other crimes
evidence is proper to prove the specific crime charged when it aids in
establishing:
(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more
crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish
the others; [and] (5) the identity of the person charged with the
commission of the crime on trial.99
Judge Werner’s rule resembled an exclusionary rule with a limited
number of exceptions for admission of this evidence.100  Nearly all of
the early commentators (except Wigmore), accepted Judge Werner’s
formulation as defining the rule’s limits.101  The rule was formulated
as a general exclusion against proof of the accused’s other bad acts
unless the other bad acts fit one of the pigeonholed exceptions men-
93. Id.  (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 289–90).
94. Reed, supra note 85, at 203 (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 288–90). R
95. Id. (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 290–93).
96. Id. (citing Molineux, 61 N.E. at 287).
97. Id.
98. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 293 (citing JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, LL.D, 1 NEW CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE OR NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE
IN CRIMINAL CASES § 1120, at 696 (4th ed. 1895)).  The court justified the reasoning, stating that
the rule, widely recognized and firmly established, is “the product of that same humane and
enlightened public spirit which, speaking through our common law, has decreed that every per-
son charged with the commission of a crime shall be protected by the presumption of innocence
until he has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 293–94.
99. Id. at 294.
100. Reed, supra note 85, at 203. R
101. Id. at 204. Molineux is “still considered good law today by New York Courts.” LEO-
NARD, supra note 60, § 3.3, at 103–04.
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tioned supra.102  There was a significant debate among the courts as to
whether they should add other exceptions to the rule.103  Courts also
debated over the necessary level of proof the prosecution needed to
establish with regard to other crimes before the jury could hear the
evidence.104  This same debate was also present during the codifica-
tion of the rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
4. Codification of the Rule
In 1938, the U.S. Attorney General challenged the American Law
Institute to create a Model Rules of Evidence.105  The first formula-
tion of the uncharged misconduct rule took an inclusionary form and
allowed other crimes evidence to be admitted, but only if the evidence
was relevant to prove the accused’s disposition to commit the instant
offense, or to commit crimes or wrongs generally.106  However, in
practice, the law was often assumed to be otherwise.107  Ultimately, no
jurisdiction adopted the Model Rule of Evidence.108  The Uniform
Rule, which was adopted in 1953, took a different approach, “exhibit-
ing elements of both the exclusionary and inclusionary [form].”109
That version began with an explicit exclusion of other crimes evi-
dence, but “subject to Rules 45 and 48, this evidence is admissible
when relevant to prove some other material fact including absence of
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge or identity.”110  A final version of the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence was eventually adopted in 1975.111
All of the federal courts follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
most states have adopted a similar version of Rule 404(b).112  The pro-
visions of the Model Code and the Uniform Rule influenced Rule
102. Reed, supra note 85, at 204. R
103. Id.  Some courts considered this as “an exception for evidence of flight from authorities
as consciousness of guilt.” Id.  In cases involving sex offenses, some courts added an exception
to permit evidence of other sexual offenses. Id. at 205.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 206 (quoting CODE OF EVID.  R. 411, at 119 (Am. Law Inst. Tentative Draft No. 2,
1941)).
107. Id.  (quoting CODE OF EVID.  R. 411, at 119 (Am. Law Inst. Tentative Draft No. 2, 1941).
108. Reed, supra note 85, at 204.
109. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 4.3.2, at 224.
110. Id. § 4.3.2, at 224–25 (quoting UNIF. R. EVID. 55).
111. Pub. L. 93–595, §1, 88 Stat. 1932, 1926 (1975).
112. All states embrace a form of Rule 404(b) except Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri, New York, and Virginia.  These states maintain a formula of the rule as one
of inadmissibility followed by a “list of judicially-recognized exceptions to the rule.”  Reed,
supra note 85, at 240.  See LEONARD, supra note 60, at 795–808, for a complete list of compara- R
ble state statutes.
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404(b).113  The rule is neither solely exclusionary nor solely inclusion-
ary;114 however, according to the Notes of Committee to the Judiciary,
it seems that Congress intended to embrace the inclusionary form.115
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence
may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, ab-
sence of mistake, or lack of accident.  On request by a defen-
dant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any
such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and
(B) do so before trial—or during trial if the court, for good
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.116
The rule begins with a prohibition, which may, at first, seem exclusion-
ary, but it is in fact a restatement of Rule 404(a), which provides evi-
dence used to prove character conformity is inadmissible.117  The next
sentence then takes an inclusionary approach,118 stating that this evi-
dence is admissible for other purposes, “such as proving motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.”119  The use of the words “such as” indi-
cates that the following list of exceptions is not exclusive.120  By saying
that the evidence may be admissible, the language suggests that the
decision to admit is discretionary, as supported by the Notes of Advi-
113. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 4.3.2, at 225.
114. Id.
115. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7 (1973).  The Committee amended the Rule 404(b) draft lan-
guage beginning with these words: “this subdivision does not exclude the evidence when of-
fered[,]” to instead read, “[i]t may, however, be admissible.” Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
These are “the words used in the 1971 Advisory Committee draft, on the ground that this formu-
lation properly placed greater emphasis on admissibility than did the final Court version.”
Id.  Likewise, the Senate Report No. 93-1277 wrote that the committee “anticipates that the
use of the discretionary word ‘may’ with respect to the admissibility of evidence of crimes,
wrongs or acts is not intended to confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial judge.”  The hope
was that with regard to the permissible uses for such evidence, the trial judge would exclude such
evidence only on the basis of Rule 403 considerations. S. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7 (1974).
116. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
117. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 4.3.2, at 226.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
120. Id.
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sory Committee on Rules.121  Federal courts in all circuits have char-
acterized the rule as inclusionary, and almost all states follow the
same view.122  However, some courts have spoken of the rule in an
exclusionary manner, and it is possible to “find inconsistent state-
ments about the nature of the rule within the same Circuit.”123  Thus,
it is important to understand the difference between the exclusionary
and inclusionary form because the formulation will influence the ad-
missibility of this evidence as illustrated in the modern application of
the rule.124
B. A Modern Application of the Rule: Huddleston v. United States
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of Rule 404(b)
evidence in Huddleston.125  Guy Huddleston was charged with selling
stolen goods in interstate commerce and possessing stolen property in
interstate commerce.126  The charges related to a shipment of Memo-
rex videocassette tapes that was stolen between April 11 and 15, 1985,
which Huddleston allegedly sold depite knowing they were stolen.127
At trial, neither party disputed that the tapes were stolen.128  In-
stead, Huddleston claimed that he did not know that the tapes were
stolen.129  The district court permitted the government to introduce
evidence of similar acts under Rule 404(b) to establish Huddleston’s
knowledge in this participant’s offense.130  This evidence indicated
that on a prior occasion, Huddleston offered to sell new, twelve-inch,
black and white televisions for a questionably low price of $28
apiece.131  Further evidence showed that an undercover FBI agent
previously arrested Huddleston after he sold the FBI agent appliances
that were later discovered to be a part of a stolen shipment.132  During
closing arguments, the district court “instructed the jury that the simi-
lar acts evidence was to be used only to establish [Huddleston’s]
121. Id. The rule does not require that the evidence be excluded in this situation: “No
mechanical solution is offered.  The determination must be made whether the danger of undue
prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other
means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403.”
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
122. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 4.3.2, at 227.
123. Id. § 4.3.2, at 227–28.
124. Id. § 4.3.2, at 228.
125. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
126. Id. at 682.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 683.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 683.
132. Id.
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knowledge, and not to prove his character.”133  The jury convicted
Huddleston on the charge of possession, and he appealed.134
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the convic-
tion, concluding that the district court erred in admitting testimony
relating to the stolen televisions because the government had failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that they were stolen in the
first place.135  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the trial court must make a preliminary finding relating
to the similar act evidence before it is submitted to the jury.136
The Court held that the question of whether the trial court must
make a preliminary finding that the person actually committed the
uncharged act is governed by Rule 104(b), under which the evidence
is admissible if the court determines that there is “sufficient evidence
to support a finding” that the alleged conduct occurred.137  The Court
further discussed the concerns of Rule 404(b) evidence.138  The Court
held that Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of extrinsic act evi-
dence when the sole purpose of introducing that evidence is to prove
character propensity.139  Otherwise, subject to other limitations, this
evidence may be admitted for other purposes.140  The Court then fur-
ther clarified the protections provided by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence against unfair prejudice associated with this kind of evidence.
The court noted that four other sources protect against unfair
prejudice.141  Those four sources stem from: (1) the Rule 404(b) re-
quirement that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; (2) Rule
402, which mandates that the evidence is relevant; (3) Rule 403, which
requires that the trial judge conduct a proper balancing test to deter-
mine whether the probative value of the evidence substantially out-
weighs any unfair prejudice; and (4) Rule 105, which provides that the
trial judge shall, upon request, issue a limiting instruction to the jury
that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper
purpose for which it was admitted.142
133. Id. at 684.  The district court gave a limiting instruction. See generally FED. R. EVID. 105
(“If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose—but not against
another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to
its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”).
134. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 684.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 685.
137. Id. at 685–91.
138. Id at 687.
139. Id.
140. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687.
141. Id. at 691–92 (citation omitted).
142. Id.
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In so holding, “[t]he Court explicitly recognized the danger of un-
fair prejudice and outlined the steps the trial court must take in deter-
mining admissibility of any such evidence under Rule 404(b).”143  This
approach suggests that the rule is inclusionary, meaning that  evidence
is potentially admissible unless offered for the sole purpose of propen-
sity.144  However, these four factors established by the Huddleston
Court provided a roadmap for the federal courts to follow.145  Further,
lower federal courts have adopted more specific standards for admit-
ting this evidence.146
C. Federal Circuit Courts Follow Suit
Many courts ignore the sole purpose test set forth in Huddleston
and, instead, have adopted checklist type tests reflecting the second
part of the holding, which have caused the “mere automatic admission
effect.”147  The federal appellate courts have all adopted tests with
subtle variations, whether it be a two, three, or four-part test.148  All
circuits recognize that the evidence must serve a relevant purpose
under Rule 402, and that the evidence must not be unfairly prejudicial
under Rule 403.149  Some courts added additional elements to the
test.150  The Third Circuit, in addition to incorporating the above-men-
tioned considerations, has held that “the proponent must clearly artic-
ulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link
of which may be the inference that the defendant has the propensity
to commit the crime charged.”151  As will be discussed infra, this addi-
tion to the test is particularly influential and important in admitting
this evidence.152
Before 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ap-
plied a four-part checklist test that reflected elements of Huddleston
but also contained additional considerations.  Other crimes evidence
is properly admitted if the evidence: “(1) tends to establish a matter at
issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime
charged; (2) is sufficiently similar and close in time to the matter at
143. LEONARD, supra note 179, § 4.5.1, at 245. R
144. Id. § 4.7, at 278–79.
145. Id. § 4.7, at 279.
146. Id. § 4.5.1, at 245.
147. See United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2012).
148. LEONARD, supra note 179 § 4.7. R
149. Id. § 4.7, at 277–78.
150. Id. § 4.7, at 277–79.
151. United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (1994)); see also United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 277–78
(3d Cir. 2014).
152. See infra notes 248–60 and accompanying text. R
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issue to be relevant; (3) supports a jury finding that the defendant
committed the similar act; and (4) has probative value that substan-
tially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.”153  The test reflected
a checklist because as long as the evidence met each requirement, it
would most likely get in.154
Other than the additional factors of similarity and timing to estab-
lish relevance, the test is in accord with the Huddleston framework,
and is inclusionary in nature.155  Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has
stressed that the proponent of the evidence must make clear the the-
ory under which the evidence is being offered.156  However, this ap-
proach received a lot criticism and in 2012, the Seventh Circuit
adopted a different approach.157
D. Rule 404(b) is Heavily Criticized
Rule 404(b) has become especially helpful and frequently used by
the prosecution in cases involving the possession of a controlled sub-
stance with the intent to distribute.158  “[E]specially in drug cases, few
defendants are new to criminal activity and the range of possible de-
fenses is fairly limited,” thus, “three of the permitted purposes in the
rule—knowledge, intent, and identity—are routinely in play.”159
However, the rule has come under much criticism by courts160 and
legal scholars.161  Courts have rationalized the widespread admission
153. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Wil-
liams, 216 F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Asher, 178 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated by United States v. Gomez,
763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir.
1984) (using prongs (1), (2), and (4) even though this is a pre-Huddleston case), abrogated by
Gomez, 763 F.3d 845.
154. See Brown, 250 F.3d at 584.
155. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 4.7, at 284.
156. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 389 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated by 545 U.S.
1125 (2005)).
157. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 855 (“The proponent of the other-act evidence should address its
relevance directly, without the straightjacket of an artificial checklist.”); United States v. Miller,
673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 404(b) requires a case-by-case determination, not a
categorical one.  The trial judge must balance the relevance of the proposed use of the evidence
to the case—and the evidence’s relevance to that proof—against the high risk that the evidence
will also tend to establish bad character and propensity to commit the charged crime.”).
158. See Miller, 673 F.3d at 698. See generally Hinkle, supra note 39, at 415–16 (discussing the R
different circuits’ approaches and tests they applied “when faced with the issue of evidence of a
prior conviction for possession to prove a separate instance of possession with intent to sell”);
Ranaldo, supra note 41, at 150 (describing the federal circuit court applications of rule 404(b)). R
159. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 855.
160. See, e.g., Miller, 673 F.3d at 696–97.
161. See, e.g., Milich, supra note 36, 780–91; Reed, supra note 85, at 242–53; David A. Sonen- R
shein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of Intent in the Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 215, 216–19 (2011).
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of prior drug sales or use as relevant to prove states of mind, without
differentiating the precise grounds of relevance “as if Rule 404(b) pro-
vided a pull-down menu in which one of the menu buttons was ‘select
all of the above.’”162  In the years following Huddleston, the cases cit-
ing Rule 404(b) seem to reflect an almost automatic admission of
other crimes evidence to prove intent in drug cases.163  According to
Professor Reed, it seemed as though to get the evidence in, all the
prosecutor needed to do was utter the “magic words” of Rule 404(b)
to frame some intermediate issue in the case unless the trial judge
believes the probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect,
waste of time, or confusion of the jury.164
Scholars also argue that Rule 404(a), a rule that bars evidence sug-
gesting character propensity, has been degraded as courts and legisla-
tures expand the nine existing exceptions under Rule 404(b) and add
new ones that the prosecution can use to its advantage but that make
Rule 404(b) too porous to sustain its justification.165  The cases seem
to support the idea that when intent is an issue in the case, this evi-
dence is automatically admitted.166  In general, case law from the past
thirty years of the rule seems to be inconsistent.167  Professor Milich
argued that the rule has been degraded because it has become too far
attenuated and is no longer supported by its initial justifications.168
Further, there are no “clear and workable guidelines for applying the
rule.”169
Milich discuses several justifications for the rule and explains how
each has lost its persuasive value.170  One of these justifications is to
prevent surprising the adverse party at trial.171  However, surprise has
already been diffused by rules adopted by most courts that require
“notice of the specific other crimes or acts of the accused that the
prosecution intends to offer.”172  According to Milich, overvaluation is
one of the weakest justifications, however, it has gained the most
prominence in shaping the modern rule.173  The overvaluation argu-
ment suggests that once the jury learns that the accused has a criminal
162. Reed, supra note 85, at 227. R
163. Miller, 673 F.3d at 698 (acknowledging this fact in the Seventh Circuit).
164. Reed, supra note 85, at 250–51. R
165. See, e.g., Milich, supra note 36, at 776. R
166. See Miller, 673 F.3d at 698.
167. Reed, supra note 85, at 215. R
168. Milich, supra note 36, at 790. R
169. See id.
170. Id. at 781–91.
171. Id. at 781.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 781–82.
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past, they may overvalue this information and chances of conviction
will increase.174  However, it is difficult to quantify exactly how much
jurors will overvalue the information, and many social science studies
offered conflicting conclusions on the matter.175  The justification that
the rule bars character propensity is undermined by the inherent pro-
pensity inferences one must make when evidence is admitted to prove
a state of mind, such as motive or intent.176  Additionally, the rule may
be difficult to apply because the exceptions are fact specific to each
case and require a different analysis.177  Further, the rule requires a
heavy reliance on a limiting instruction, which often serves to cause
more confusion than direction.178
E. Rationales for the Exclusion of Other Crimes Evidence
A core principle of Anglo-American law is that a person “should
not be judged strenuously by reference to the awesome spectre of his
past life.”179  A defendant is not on trial for who she is or what she has
the propensity to do but, rather, for what she did.180  The problem is
not that evidence of other crimes is irrelevant, the problem is that the
jury may overvalue what that type of evidence is being offered to
show.181  The U.S. Supreme Court embraced this view in Michelson v.
United States.182  The Court explained that the evidence “is not re-
jected because [it] is irrelevant”; it is rejected because it may “weigh
too much with the jury[,]” and, in effect, will “overpersuade them . . .
to prejudge [the defendant] and deny [her]” of a fair trial in defense of
a particular charge.183  The Court emphasized that the policy of ex-
cluding this evidence is supported by the practical experience that the
174. Milich, supra note 36, at 782. R
175. Id. at 783.
176. Id. at 786.
177. Id. at 788.
178. Id. at 789.
179. LEONARD, supra note 60, §1.2, at 2 (quoting M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other
Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 325 (1956)).
180. See id.
181. Id. § 1.2, at 5–6 (citing 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 194, at 415 (3d ed. 1940)).  According to John H. Wigmore, evidence of other acts is excluded
because it has too, rather than too little, much probative value. Id. § 1.2, at 6–7 (“The natural
and inevitable tendency of the tribunal . . . is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of
crime . . . and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of
it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.” (quoting 1 WIGMORE,
supra note 181, § 194, at 646)). R
182. 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
183. Id.
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exclusion will prevent confusing the issues and reduce any unfair sur-
prise and substantial undue prejudice.184
As stated supra, a defendant is not on trial for who she is but for
what she has done.185  So, why then would the government want to
introduce evidence of prior crimes?  John H. Wigmore, a well-known
evidence scholar, suggests that the rationale behind the introduction
of this evidence is based on the doctrine of chances,186 “the instinctive
recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of in-
nocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is
perceived that this element cannot explain them all.”187  In other
words, the likelihood that the defendant acted innocently is dimin-
ished by the fact that she was not innocent in the past.188  Such a pow-
erful tool for the prosecution does not come for free as shown through
the court’s development of the application of this rule.189
In Old Chief v. United States,190 the U.S. Supreme Court articulated:
“The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the
capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder
into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the
offense charged.”191  The main concern with using other crimes evi-
dence is that the jury will overvalue or confuse the purposes for which
the evidence is being offered and, instead, conclude that the defen-
dant acted in conformity with her previous conduct and committed
the alleged crime.192  This is the rationale behind the overvaluation
theory, which suggests that the jury will instead convict the defendant
for his past actions instead of the crimes currently being charged.193
This is because the evidence may prejudice the jury by invoking the
jury’s punitive instincts.194  Although this theory permeates case
184. Id. at 476.
185. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. R
186. 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 302, at 611 (2d ed. 1923).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 125–57 and accompanying text (discussing Huddleston). R
190. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
191. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
192. Milich, supra note 36, at 782. R
193. Id. at 781–82.
194. Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), 70 IOWA L. REV. 579, 584–85 (1985).  “[E]xclusionary rules [of evidence] were estab-
lished to balance the sometimes conflicting goals of truth and fairness by keeping from the jury
evidence which would provoke an emotional, rather than rational, decision.  Of equal signifi-
cance to emotional prejudice, however, is the historical concern with evidence which might mis-
lead, rather than enlighten, the jury.” Id. at 583 n.17 (citation omitted).
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law195 and other scholarly work,196 some scholars are critical of the
argument’s strength.197  Professor Paul S. Milich is particularly critical
of this theory, arguing there is a lack of consistent social science re-
search supporting it198 and that the forbidden propensity inference is
not the true problem in the overvaluation theory.199
During trial, there is a concern that character evidence will
overcomplicate the issues and confuse the jury.200  Rule 403 requires
the court to conduct a balancing test to determine whether the proba-
tive value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of
“unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue de-
lay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”201
Probative value is a concept that connects the evidence to the histori-
cal fact the proponent is trying to establish.202  Therefore, a proper
Rule 403 balancing test embraces accuracy as a means for admissibil-
ity.203  The rule’s importance and significance is illustrated, as dis-
cussed supra, through the court’s long, imperfect struggle to attain a
suitable analysis.204
The nature of other crimes evidence, and Rule 404(a) character trait
evidence for that matter, can be troubling to U.S. culture because it
has long held a prohibition on “speaking ill of others.”205  Thus, Rule
404 encourages the practice of using caution when making a judgment
on someone based on this evidence.206  Most importantly, the rule
supports the concept of fundamental fairness, which the U.S. adver-
sarial court process is founded on.207  As such, in criminal trials, the
highest standard of proof is “bottomed on a fundamental value deter-
195. See, e.g., Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181; Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691
(1988).
196. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note 60, § 1.2; Milich, supra note 36, at passim. R
197. Milich, supra note 36, at 781. R
198. Milich argued that “the precise amount by which jurors allegedly overvalue character
evidence is unknown, which makes it impossible to gauge whether such overvaluation is worse,
from an epistemic standpoint, than denying the jury of whatever ‘proper’ probative value charac-
ter evidence has.” Id. at 783.
199. “The overvaluation argument leans heavily on the propensity inference as the source of
the problem and thus uses the propensity inference as a proxy for what is bad about character
evidence.” Id. at 785.
200. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 1.2, at 9.
201. FED. R. EVID. 403.
202. Weissenberger, supra note 194, at 584. R
203. Id. at 585.  “Distraction is always a function of probative value; that which is distracting
can only be so labeled after it is determined that its probative value is low.” Id. at 584.
204. See supra notes 60–178, and accompanying text.
205. LEONARD, supra note 60, § 1.2, at 9.
206. Id.
207. Weissenberger, supra note 194, at 588, 609.  “The most that can and should be offered to R
litigants is a fair trial.” Id. at 583.
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mination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free.”208
III. ANALYSIS
Rule 404(b) is the most challenged Rule of Evidence on appeal,
which demonstrates the rule’s complexity and inconsistent applica-
tion.209  The heavy criticism of this rule finally reached the Seventh
Circuit in Miller and Gomez, two cases in which the court changed the
existing law by creating a rules-based framework for the admissibility
of other crimes evidence under Rule 404(b), which differs from the
former checklist test.  The rules-based approach is more appropriate
because the former checklist test tended to support a mere automatic
admission of other crimes evidence.  The new test refocuses the issue
on relevancy by conflating Rules 402 and 403 with the requirement
that the proponent articulate a relevant purpose for the evidence.  Al-
though the new test ignores the sole purpose standard derived from
Huddleston, the rules-based approach nonetheless reflects the con-
cerns and protections presented in Huddleston.  Thus, just as the Third
Circuit has already done, all of the federal circuit courts of appeals
should adopt this test to promote uniformity and efficiency in deter-
ring propensity evidence.  Additionally, this rules-based approach
should be modified to begin with the “sole purpose” standard to bet-
ter ensure fundamental fairness.  This Part provides an analysis of the
Seventh Circuit’s opinions in Miller and Gomez,210 which includes the
realization that the previous test was no longer useful,211 and argues
that the new analysis is still in line with Huddleston.212
A. The Seventh Circuit Changes the Law: Miller and Gomez
Prosecutors were quick to catch on to the mere automatic admis-
sion of 404(b) evidence. Although there is no specific reason but per-
haps because the government abused the admission of this evidence,
the Seventh Circuit decided to change the test for admissibility.  In
2012, the Seventh Circuit changed the existing law, decided Miller,
208. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
209. Hinkle, supra note 39, at 405. R
210. See infra notes 213–40 and accompanying text (analyzing the opinions of Miller and R
Gomez and arguing this new approach employed by the Seventh Circuit changed the existing
law).
211. See infra notes 241–47 and accompanying text (arguing that the previous test used has
become no longer useful).
212. See infra notes 248–71 and accompanying text (clarifying that this new approach is still R
within the broader holding of Huddleston despite the omission of the “sole purpose” standard).
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and abandoned the traditional four-part checklist test used in the
past.213
The defendant in Miller appealed his three convictions: (1) posses-
sion of more than five grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute;
(2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime; and (3)
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.214  As a defense, Miller
claimed that the drugs were not his.215  To establish Miller’s intent at
trial, the prosecution offered evidence under Rule 404(b) that Miller
had a previous felony conviction in 2000 for possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute.216  Miller argued that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting the details of this prior conviction into evi-
dence.217  Ultimately the Seventh Circuit agreed, but it first dove into
a different analysis of Rule 404(b) evidence.218
The court repeated its warning regarding the dangers of too loosely
admitting other crimes evidence under the exceptions in Rule
404(b).219  The court recognized that the arguments presented in the
case suggested that admittance of prior drug crimes to prove intent to
commit the present drug crimes has become too routine.220  In its
analysis, the court refrained from using the four-part checklist test
previously outlined by the Seventh Circuit.  Instead, the court rejected
it and created a new rule, stating: “In every Rule 404(b) case relying
on intent, the court (1) must consider the probative value of the prior
act to prove present intent, and (2) must weigh that value against the
tendency of the evidence to suggest unfairly a propensity to commit
similar bad acts.”221  The court further noted: “Confusion and misuse
of Rule 404(b) can be avoided by asking the prosecution exactly how
the proffered evidence should work in the mind of a juror to establish
213. United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 2012).
214. Id. at 692.
215. Id. at 696.
216. Id. at 692.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 701.
219. Use of a prior drug distribution conviction to prove intent to distribute is often a
disguised use for impermissible propensity purposes, and was so here. We have often
warned about the dangers of applying the exceptions in Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) too loosely to admit prior bad acts, especially in drug cases, without paying close
attention to both the legitimacy of the purpose for which the evidence is to be used and
the need for it.
Miller, 673 F.3d at 692.
220. Id. at 697.
221. Id. at 699 (“The availability of precedent that balances the relevance of bad acts evidence
and decides to admit it does not excuse prosecutors or courts from asking in each new case
whether and how prior bad acts evidence might be relevant, probative, and fair.”).
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the fact the government claims to be trying to prove.”222  The propo-
nent of the evidence must, therefore, prove a propensity-free line of
reasoning for admitting this evidence.223  Thus, this requirement
avoids the forbidden propensity inference: “He intended to do it
before, ladies and gentlemen, so he must have intended to do it
again.”224
Here, the court abandoned the four-part checklist test and, instead,
conflated the relevance requirements of Rule 402225 with the balanc-
ing test of Rule 403.226  Additionally, the court required the propo-
nent to provide a propensity-free line of reasoning to admit the
evidence.227  This new trend in the law further limits the admissibility
of propensity evidence.228  The new rules-based approach refocuses
222. Id.
223. Id. at 700 (“A prosecutor who wants to use prior bad acts evidence . . . must come to
court prepared with a specific reason, other than propensity, why the evidence will be probative
of a disputed issue that is permissible under Rule 404(b).  Mere recitation that a permissible
Rule 404(b) purpose is ‘at issue’ does not suffice.”).
224. Id. at 699.  To be clear, however, this does not suggest that the evidence should be ex-
cluded if there is any propensity inference at all.  Instead, “Rule 404(b) excludes the evidence if
its relevance to ‘another purpose’ is established only through the forbidden propensity infer-
ence.” United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Notably the new
framework does not reflect Huddleston’s sole purpose test.
225. Rule 402 deals with relevance of evidence and states:
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:
• the United States Constitution;
• a federal statute;
• these rules; or
• other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.
FED. R. EVID. 402.  This rule should be read in conjunction with Rule 401 which defines relevant
evidence as that which is both probative (having “any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence”) and material (“the fact must be of conse-
quence in determining the action”). Id. at 401.  “Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of
any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter
properly provable in the case.” Id. at 401 advisory committee’s note.
226. United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2012). See generally FED. R. EVID. 403.
227. Miller, 673 F.3d at 700.
228. The court clearly recognizes the sense of “automatic admission” of this type of evidence
in recent drug cases. Id. at 696, 698.  The new test hopes to preclude propensity evidence, but is
that what recent additions to the Federal Rules of Evidence suggest that Congress intends?  For
example: “In 1994, Congress passed Rules 413, 414, and 415, which permit prosecutors to admit
[evidence of] an accused’s past sexual criminal history when charging [her] with sexual miscon-
duct in criminal and civil cases.”  Reed, supra note 85, at 251.  There is no balancing test required R
for this evidence, it automatically comes in. See FED. R. EVID. 413(a), 414(a), 415(a).  These
rules permit the jury to make a propensity inference in sexual misconduct cases, in fact that is
the essential purpose. Id.  Although those rules specifically relate to sexual misconduct, here, it
is interesting that the court seems to be trending on curtailing the admission of propensity
evidence.
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the issue of admissibility on the relevance of the evidence as opposed
to requiring the evidence to simply pass a checklist for admission.
After Miller introduced this new trend, Gomez confirmed it.229  De-
cided in 2014, Gomez, like Miller, addressed similar issues surround-
ing the admissibility of prior drug convictions in a possession with
intent to distribute charge.230  In Gomez, the court expressly aban-
doned the four-part test, noting: “Our four-part test for evaluating the
admissibility of other-act evidence has ceased to be useful.  We now
abandon it in favor of a more straightforward rules-based approach.
This change . . . we hope will produce clarity and better practice in
applying the relevant rules of evidence.”231  The Court stated that
“the proponent of the evidence must first establish that the other act
is relevant to a specific purpose other than the person’s character or
propensity to behave in a certain way.”232  It is not necessary to ex-
clude other act evidence whenever a propensity inference can be
drawn.233  However, “its relevance to ‘another purpose’ must be es-
tablished through a chain of reasoning that does not rely on the for-
bidden inference that the person has a certain character and acted in
accordance with that character on the occasion charged in the
case.”234  Then, if the proponent makes this showing, the trial judge
must, in every case, conduct a 403 balancing test to determine whether
the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the poten-
tial for any unfair prejudice.235  This Rule 403 “balancing should take
account of the extent to which the non-propensity fact for which the
evidence is offered actually is at issue in the case.”236
This new test refocuses the issue on whether the evidence has a rel-
evant purpose by conflating the Rule 402 relevancy requirements with
the Rule 403 balancing test and, additionally, requiring that the pro-
229. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 864.
230. Id. at 850.
231. Id. at 853.
Multipart tests are commonplace in our law and can be useful, but sometimes they stray
or distract from the legal principles they are designed to implement; over time misap-
plication of the law can creep in. . . .  Especially in drug cases like this one, other-act
evidence is too often admitted almost automatically, without consideration of the “le-
gitimacy of the purpose for which the evidence is to be used and the need for it.”
Id. (quoting Miller, 673 F.3d at 692).
232. Id. at 860.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860.
236. Id. Given the length of the holding, it is ironic that the Court wanted to “clarify” the
rule.  To simplify further, the new test can be boiled down to a “three-P” standard, whether (1)
the evidence is proper; (2) prejudice outweighs probative value; and (3) there is a propensity-
free theory of admission.
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ponent provide a propensity-free line of reasoning.237  The new test is
based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, hence the name “rules-based
approach.”238  Since Gomez, the Seventh Circuit has followed this
new test in several other cases containing Rule 404(b) issues, citing to
Gomez as abandoning the old, and establishing the new, test.239
Moreover, the new rules-based approach developed in Gomez has
been adopted by the Third Circuit,240 and the remaining circuits
should follow.  The previous four-part checklist test used by the Sev-
enth Circuit is no longer useful.  Although the new test seems to
dance around the U.S. Supreme Court’s sole purpose test stated in
Huddleston, it is nonetheless consistent with the broader holding of
Huddleston in that it reflects the view that a rules-based approach will
deter the admission of propensity evidence. This is done by refocusing
the inquiry on the relevancy of this evidence.  The new test reduces
the reliance on a limiting instruction to deter a propensity inference.
Therefore, the new test should be followed by all of the Circuits.
B. A Change for the Better: The Seventh Circuit’s Checklist Test Is
No Longer Useful
If courts want to ensure the fundamental principles of a fair trial,
they must adopt the new rules-based framework of the Seventh Cir-
cuit and additionally begin their analysis with the “sole purpose” stan-
dard.  In determining that the four-part test was no longer
appropriate, the Seventh Circuit stated that some parts of the old test
lacked an adequate basis in the Federal Rules of Evidence and in-
duced an automatic admission of evidence as long as the evidence fits
the criteria.241
The first step of the old test correlates to a basic admissibility in-
quiry under Rule 402, that the evidence be admitted for a proper pur-
pose provided in  Rule 404(b), such as intent or knowledge.242  “Step
two of the test, which requires an inquiry into the similarity and timing
of the other act, is loosely connected to the basic principles of rele-
237. Id.
238. Id. at 853.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Stacy, 769 F.3d 969, 973–76 (7th
Cir. 2014); United States v. Vance, 764 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2014) (“As this court explained in
[Gomez],  . . . regarding the first of these requirements, the relevance of the evidence for a
proper purpose ‘must be established through a chain of reasoning that does not rely solely on the
forbidden [propensity] inference . . . .’”).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 281–83 (3d Cir. 2014).
241. Gomez, 763 F.3d, at 853.
242. Id.
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vance found in Rules 401 and 402.”243  However, the strength of this
inquiry heavily depends on the facts of the case and the particular
theory of admissibility.244  The Seventh Circuit has often stated that
this requirement is not “unduly rigid” but, instead, “loosely inter-
preted and applied.”245  Having a remote foundation in the Rules of
Evidence, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the similarity and timing
of the other act may not bear on the relevance question at all, and it is
too often treated as a formal checklist.246  Rather, the Seventh Circuit
suggests that “it best to return to a framework that weighs the rele-
vance of other-act evidence directly.”247  The Seventh Circuit changed
the law by replacing the former checklist test with a rules-based
framework, which refocuses the issue for admissibility on relevancy.
C. Rules-Based Approach Relation to Huddleston
Although the new test ignores the “sole purpose” standard derived
from Huddleston by not including it in the analysis, this test nonethe-
less reflects the concerns and protections presented in Huddleston by
reflecting the view that an approach grounded in the Rules will deter
admission of propensity evidence.248  The new rule refocuses the anal-
ysis on the “legitimacy of the purpose for which the evidence is to be
used and the need for it.”249  The rule is easier to apply as it asks three
simple questions (is it proper, probative, and propensity-free?)250 in-
stead of conducting a four-part inquiry that may not even be relevant
(e.g., the timing of the prior act).251
The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Huddleston reflected the gen-
eral intent of the framers of the Federal Rules of Evidence—that the
rule be inclusionary.252  However, in actual practice, courts have used
the rule as if it were “a categorical exclusionary rule followed by a
limited number of judicially-recognized exceptions.”253  Professor
Reed argues that federal courts often pay lip service to the idea that it
243. Id. at 854.
244. Id.  (“In some cases the relative similarity of the other act to the charged offense may be
unimportant as a test of relevance.”).
245. Id.  (quoting United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2011) and United States
v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2008)).
246. Id.
247. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 854–55.
248. Id. at 853–54.
249. Id. at 853 (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2012)).
250. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 684 (1988).
251. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 854.
252. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 688–89.
253. Reed, supra note 85, at 243. R
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is an inclusionary rule and instead apply it as exclusionary.254  In
Gomez, the Seventh Circuit addresses this issue in a footnote;255 how-
ever, arguably, this discussion classifying the rule as inclusionary
should have received more attention in the opinion because it is a
matter of extreme importance.
The Seventh Circuit reiterates and reaffirms the intent of the rule as
reflected by the framers and in Huddleston.256  The first inquiry in the
Gomez test requires the evidence be proper, in that it must be rele-
vant to a specific purpose other than propensity.257  This requirement
directly reflects the first and second steps in the Huddleston frame-
work.258  Evidence is proper under Rule 404(b) as long as it does not
suggest a propensity inference, thus, reflecting an inclusionary form of
the rule intended by the framers and Huddleston.259  The second step
of the test, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by its unfair prejudice, is again in accordance with the
third part of the Huddleston framework requiring a Rule 403 bal-
ance.260  Thus, the new test bolsters part three of the Huddleston
framework because it requires the proponent to provide a propensity-
free line of reasoning, making the probative value weigh heavier than
the prejudicial effect at the outset of the Rule 403 balancing test.261
This is important for two reasons.
First, it is nearly impossible to prove intent by using a prior convic-
tion for the same offense without inherently suggesting a propensity
inference.262  Trying to infer intent in the present case using a prior act
in a different situation is “highly questionable as a matter of both
human personality analysis and simple logic.”263  Even if a limiting
254. Id.; see People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901) (fashioning a rule that took the
exclusionary form with a limited number of exceptions for admission of this evidence); supra
notes 98–103 and accompanying text (discussing Molineux). R
255. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 855 n.3.  The court clarified that Rule 404(b) is often misunderstood
as a rule of exclusion subject to certain exceptions, which is not at all accurate. Id.  Read care-
fully, the rule does not specifically say that propensity evidence is inadmissible except when used
to prove motive, opportunity, intent, etc., instead, the rule says that such evidence is categorically
inadmissible. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1)).
256. Id. at 853–54 (discussing the Huddleston case).
257. Id. at 860.
258. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691–92.
259. See id. at 691 (using a four-part test, in the first part stating, “the evidence be offered for
a proper purpose”); Gomez, 763 F.3d at 855 n.3.
260. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691 (stating, as to the third part of the test, “from the assess-
ment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the
similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice”); Gomez,
763 F.3d at 860.
261. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691; Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860.
262. Sonenshein, supra note 161, at 217. R
263. Id.
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instruction (which will be discussed in detail infra) is given, offers of
this kind of evidence present the greatest prejudice because it makes
for the inevitable propensity inference.264  Professor David Sonen-
shein summarized: “What chain of reasoning can link the prior drug
history . . . to the charged crime other than one that infers that the
defendant has a drug-related propensity, and that based on this pro-
pensity, the jury can disbelieve him when he denies criminal intent as
to the latest drug incident?”265 Consequently, “[t]here is no propen-
sity-free chain.”266  The new Gomez test requires a propensity-free
line of reasoning, which disposes of this problem.
Second, the ultimate decision to admit the evidence lies within the
Rule 403 balancing test, which requires a subjective evaluation of the
judge.267  By providing the judge with a propensity-free line of reason-
ing for admitting this evidence, the judge’s discretionary evaluation
becomes a lot easier.268  A record will have been created for which the
judge cannot easily deviate from, and therefore it becomes more diffi-
cult for the judge to have abused his discretion.269  Thus, the new test
does not overburden the trial judge’s discretion.
The Seventh Circuit’s new rules-based approach of Rule 404(b) evi-
dence reflects the broader relevancy concern of Huddleston, and the
importance of a rules-grounded approach.270  The rules-based ap-
proach refocuses on the issue of how the evidence is admissible in-
stead of whether it is admissible.271  It is another reminder of the
concept of fundamental fairness supporting our adversarial system.
Specifically, the defendant is not on trial for who she is but, rather, for
the crime charged.  Therefore, uniform adoption of this approach
should be implemented.
264. Id.  This Comment discusses  the issue of intent.  This is not to suggest that all prior
crimes have an inherent propensity inference.  “For example where the defendant claims he was
not in the neighborhood where a murder was committed, the government’s offer that he had in
fact committed an unrelated burglary in that neighborhood at around the same time as the mur-
der would be relevant and not overly prejudicial.” Id.  On the other hand, in a murder case,
offering evidence of an earlier unrelated murder committed by the defendant, to show “intent”
in the case at bar is “logically and scientifically irrelevant to show such intent.” Id. at 218.
265. Id. (alteration in original).
266. Id. (quoting Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on
Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 191–92 (1998)).
267. Reed, supra note 85, at 216. R
268. Id. at 214.
269. See id. at 214–15.
270. See supra notes 125–46 and accompanying text (detailing the U.S. Supreme Court’s hold- R
ing in Huddleston).
271. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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D. Circuit Uniformity
The new test should be adopted as a standard test by the rest of the
federal circuit courts of appeals as uniformity among the circuits en-
sures compliance and fairness.  Currently, only the Third Circuit has
adopted the rules-based approach identified in Miller.272
The Second and Tenth Circuits still follow the four-part Huddleston
framework.273 Although the D.C. Circuit does not expressly state a
test for admissibility, the cases cite to Huddleston.274  The Fourth Cir-
cuit follows a four-part test that is slightly different from Huddle-
ston.275  The Fourth Circuit requires: (1) that the evidence “be
relevant to an issue” (the more similar the prior act, the more relevant
it becomes); (2) that the evidence is “necessary in the sense that it is
probative of an essential claim or an element of the offense”; (3) the
prior act be reliable; and (4) a determination as to whether the proba-
tive value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice.276  The requirements of timeliness and reliability are similar
to the test previously applied by the Seventh Circuit.277
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits apply similar tests that also resemble
the four-part test previously applied by the Seventh Circuit.278  Those
circuits require that the evidence:
“(1) proves a material element of the offense for which the defen-
dant is now charged, (2) if admitted to prove intent, is similar to the
offense charged, (3) is based on sufficient evidence, and (4) is not
too remote in time.”279  The only difference between these two cir-
cuits is that that the Eighth Circuit does not have the explicit lan-
guage, “if admitted to prove intent,” in step two of its test.280
The First and Fifth Circuits apply a simple two-step inquiry.281  The
court must ask: “(1) ‘whether the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant
to an issue other than the defendant’s character’; and (2) whether the
272. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 281–83 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United
States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2012)).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Smalls, 752 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Scott, 677 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2012).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 597 F.3d 399, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
275. See, e.g., United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 380 (4th Cir. 2014).
276. Id. at 380 (quoting United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997)).
277. See generally United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 589, 584 (7th Cir. 2001) (requiring evi-
dence to be “sufficiently similar and close in time”).
278. See, e.g., United States v. Battle, 774 F.3d 504, 513 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Har-
drick, 766 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014).
279. Hardrick, 766 F.3d at 1055 (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234,
1242 (9th Cir. 2004)).
280. See Battle, 744 F.3d at 513.
281. See, e.g., United States v. Lede´e, 772 F.3d 21, 36 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Wallace,
759 F.3d 486, 493 (5th Cir. 2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL304.txt unknown Seq: 29 17-OCT-16 9:29
2016] A NEW ANALYSIS OF 404(B) EVIDENCE 1083
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by undue
prejudice.”282
The Sixth Circuit applies a three-step test unlike any of the other
circuits.283 The court must first determine that the act offered under
404(b) actually occurred, then decide whether the evidence is proba-
tive of a material issue other than character, and, lastly, conduct a 403
balancing test.284
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit also applies a dissimilar three-step
test.285  In this circuit, a court must determine that: (1) “the evidence
must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character”286;
(2) “the act must be established by sufficient proof to permit a jury
finding that the defendant committed the extrinsic act”;287 and (3)
“the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially out-
weighed by its undue prejudice.”288
As discussed supra, there is no uniform test applied by every circuit.
However, all of the circuits seem to embrace the requirement that the
evidence be relevant for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and that
the evidence’s probative value must not be substantially outweighed
by unfair prejudice.289  Again, all the Gomez test adds to these com-
mon requirements is a propensity-free reasoning for admitting the evi-
dence.290  Therefore, in the interest of promoting uniformity
throughout the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, the new test in
Gomez (created by the Seventh Circuit and adopted by the Third Cir-
cuit) should be applied by all the remaining circuit courts.  The new
test does not differ from what the courts already use.  In fact, the new
test substantially summarizes the concerns the other courts seem to
imply—that the evidence is proper, lacks propensity, and is probative.
In addition, the rules-based framework should be modified to begin
with the sole purpose standard derived from Huddleston.  From the
discussion supra, it seems as if the courts ignore the sole purpose test
in exchange for a multipart test.291  The sole purpose test prohibits the
introduction of extrinsic act evidence when the sole purpose of intro-
282. Wallace, 759 F.3d at 493 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 774 (5th Cir.
2007)).
283. See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir. 2013).
284. Id. (citations omitted).
285. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, at 1266 (11th Cir. 2015).
286. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1203 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Mathews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2005)).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See supra notes 273–88 and accompanying text. R
290. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
291. See supra notes 209–40 and accompanying text. R
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ducing that evidence is to prove character propensity.292  Including
this important standard at the start of the rules-based approach en-
sures accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Huddle-
ston.  It also simplifies the standard because if the sole purpose is none
other than propensity, then the evidence is inadmissible and no fur-
ther inquiry is needed.  Therefore, all circuits should adopt the rules-
based framework which should begin with the sole purpose standard
in accordance with Huddleston.  Adoption of this approach will ensure
fundamental fairness in our trial system and will prevent the misappli-
cation of one of the most useful rules of evidence.  Although the new
approach may be difficult, it is a necessary adjustment.
IV. IMPACT
Adoption of this new approach will further the principles of funda-
mental fairness in trial procedure.  This Section: (1) discusses the im-
pact this new approach will have on trial practice and provides an
examples of the successful admission of this evidence under Gomez;293
(2) discusses how the new approach will reduce the reliance on limit-
ing instructions;294 and (3) suggests that by refocusing the issue on
relevancy, the mere automatic admission effect is closed.295
A. Difficult but Not Impossible
Judge Easterbrook was quite correct in stating: “Prosecutors who
do not understand and apply the full scope of the Gomez decision will
find their convictions hard to sustain on appeal.”296  Undoubtedly,
federal prosecutors did not greet the new test advanced in Gomez
with wide-open arms.  As the new test requires a propensity-free
chain of reasoning, the job of a federal prosecutor has become sub-
stantially more difficult to admit other crimes evidence to prove in-
tent.297  For example, prosecutors must have to articulate why
evidence of a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute
292. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988).
293. See infra notes 296–314 and accompanying text (providing examples of several cases in R
which the court conducted the new rules-based approach analysis and ultimately admitted the
evidence).
294. See infra notes 315–49 and accompanying text (explaining the effectiveness of limiting R
instructions at trial and how the new approach will reduce this reliance).
295. See infra notes 350–54 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic admission ap- R
proach and how this new approach will put an end to this effect).
296. United States v. Lawson, 776 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2015).
297. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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is probative of the defendant’s intent on her current charge for the
same crime—an inference that inherently reeks of propensity.298
The Seventh Circuit has applied the new test of Gomez six other
times in 2014.299  Other crimes evidence was admissible in three out of
six cases.300  The court found that it was an error for the trial judge to
admit the evidence twice,301 and, in one case, the defense did not pre-
serve error on the record for appeal.302
The new test makes admission of other crimes evidence difficult but
not impossible.   For example, in United States v. Curtis,303 the prose-
cution successfully admitted other crimes evidence under Rule 404(b),
and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.304  The defendant in Curtis
was found guilty of three misdemeanor counts of failure to pay in-
come taxes.305  Notably, for more than fifty years,  the defendant had
been a lawyer, running a successful sole proprietorship during his ap-
peal.306  The defendant filed taxes for the years 2007 through 2009,
and he owed a substantial amount of $151,906, $113,354, and $112,973,
respectively.307  However, the defendant failed to pay his tax liabil-
ity.308  An element of the charge was that the defendant “acted will-
fully in failing to pay[,]” which the defendant contested at trial.309  To
satisfy this element, the prosecution sought to admit evidence under
Rule 404(b) that the defendant had failed to pay his payroll taxes for
his employees during the same time period for which he was now on
trial.310
Citing Gomez, the Seventh Circuit held that the evidence was ad-
missible because neither of the government’s two reasons offered in
support of admitting the payroll tax evidence relied on the forbidden
298. See generally Hinkle, supra note 39, 413–14 (discussing how a judge should apply the R
test); Ranaldo, supra note 41, at 151 (discussing similar facts in United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d R
186 (5th Cir. 1993)).
299. See Lawson, 776 F.3d at 519; United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 725–26 (7th Cir.
2014); United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 401, 409–10 (7th Cir. 2014) (providing no reference to
Gomez or Rule 404 in the opinion, but applying the test); United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524,
532–33 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Stacy, 769 F.3d 969, 973–74 (7th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Vance, 764 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2014).
300. See Clark, 754 F.3d at 410; Schmitt, 770 F.3d at 540; Vance, 764 F.3d at 671.
301. See Chapman, 765 F.3d at 727; Stacy, 769 F.3d at 974.
302. See Lawson, 776 F.3d at 522.
303. 781 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2015).
304. Id. at 911–12.
305. Id. at 905.
306. Id. at 906.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Curtis, 781 F.3d at 907.
310. Id. at 909.
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propensity inference.311  The court adopted the government’s reason-
ing and concluded that “the evidence was relevant to rebut the impli-
cation that [the defendant] had fully paid his recent tax
obligations.”312  Additionally, the evidence was also relevant to rebut
the defendant’s anticipated defense that he acted with a good faith
misunderstanding in failing to pay his taxes in the those three years.313
The government’s fully articulated reasoning following Gomez did not
rely on the forbidden propensity evidence, was ultimately successful,
and did not require the reliance on a limiting instruction.314
B. The Rules-Based Framework Reduces the Reliance on the
Limiting Instruction
Part four of the Huddleston framework offers that Rule 105 . . .
“provides that the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that
the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper pur-
pose for which it was admitted.”315  Pursuant to Rule 105 a judge must
issue a limiting instruction when evidence is admitted for a narrow
purpose.316  The judge will define the parameters by which the jury
may consider the evidence.317  By requiring the proponent of the evi-
dence to provide a propensity-free line of reasoning, the reliance on
such a limiting instruction to preclude a propensity inference is greatly
reduced.  In general, judges have long been quite weary of using limit-
ing instructions.318  Rightfully so because “a large body of research
indicates that jurors have great difficultly ignoring information once
they have become aware of it.”319  The classic example of the “purple
elephant in the room” comes to mind.  For example, if a person is told
not to imagine a purple elephant in the middle of the room, she imme-
diately imagines just that.  The same thing can be said for a limiting
instruction; jurors often pay greater attention to evidence when an ad-
311. Id. at 910.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1988).
316. FED. R. EVID. 105.
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) (quoting Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be over-
come by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know [this] to be unmitigated fiction
. . . .” (alterations in original))).
319. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions:
Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions To Disregard Pretrial Publicity
and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 678 (2000).
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monition is given than when the judge remains silent on the issue.320
“With few exceptions, empirical research has repeatedly demon-
strated that . . .  limiting instructions are unsuccessful at controlling
jurors’ cognitive processes.”321
A study conducted in 1973 by Professor Doob and his colleague
Kirshenbaum offered participants a hypothetical burglary case and in-
formed only one-half of the participants that the defendant had a
prior record.322  Those participants were then given a judicial instruc-
tion limiting their consideration of the prior record to determine cred-
ibility only, and not as an indicator of guilt.323  The study showed that
“[p]articipants were more likely to rate the defendant as guilty when
they were exposed to prior criminal record information than when no
record information was given.”324
Other studies reached similar results.325  In 1985, researchers Wiss-
ler and Saks conducted a study in which the participants were told one
of the following things: (1) that the defendant had previously been
convicted of either a similar crime or committed; (2) a dissimilar crime
of perjury; or (3) were given no information about a prior record.326
The participants that were presented with prior record information
were given a similar judicial instruction to use the information only to
determine the defendant’s credibility, and not as an indication that the
defendant had a criminal disposition.327  Interestingly, the results indi-
cated that the defendant’s credibility ratings were not affected by the
prior conviction information.328  The jurors perceived all defendants
as equally credible despite receiving varying information about prior
convictions or lack there of.329  However, it appeared that verdicts
were affected by type of prior offense.330 There were significantly
more guilty verdicts for defendants with similar convictions (75%)
320. Id.
321. Id. at 686.
322. Id. (citing A.N. Doob & H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of S.
12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L. QUARTERLY 88 (1972)).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See infra notes 326–31 and accompanying text (discussing a study conducted by research- R
ers, Wissler and Saks, in addition to explaining the “backfire effect”).
326. Sonenshein, supra note 161, at 269 (citing Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the R
Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence To Decide on
Guilt, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 40 (1985)).
327. Wissler & Saks, supra note 326, at 40. R
328. Id. at 43.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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than defendants with dissimilar convictions (52.5%), perjury convic-
tions (60%), or no convictions (42.5%).331
There are many factors that influence the success of these limiting
instructions, such as the backfire effect.332  The backfire effect occurs
when jurors pay greater attention to information after it has been
ruled inadmissible than if the judge had said nothing at all about the
evidence (i.e., the purple elephant example supra).333  The occurrence
of a backfire effect may, in part, depend on the type of evidence that
is being offered.334  However, this effect may not occur when the ju-
rors consider the information unreliable.335
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the effectiveness of a limit-
ing instruction is highly questionable.336  The Huddleston framework
provides that the protection from unfair prejudice of other crimes evi-
dence emanates from the limiting instruction of Rule 105.337  By re-
quiring a propensity-free line of reasoning for the admission of this
evidence, the Gomez test forecloses the need for a limiting instruction
to provide such protection from unfair prejudice.338  Arguably, an in-
struction may still be given, but its effectiveness will be strengthened
on the propensity-free line of reasoning.
Although it is true the propensity-free reasoning requirement does
not overburden the judge’s discretion in making admissibility deci-
sions, judges cannot solely rely on a limiting instruction to prevent a
propensity inference.  As discussed supra, limiting instructions are not
completely reliable.339  Additionally, prior to the Gomez decision,
courts admitted Rule 404(b) other crimes evidence as long as a limit-
ing instruction was given.340
In United States v. Brooks,341 the defendant appealed the admission
of a prior drug conviction during his trial for various drug conspiracy
331. Id. at 43 tbl.2.
332. See Sonenshein, supra note 161, at 269, 270 & n.357 (citing Rachel K. Cush & Jane Good- R
man Delahunty, The Influence of Limiting Instructions on Processing and Judgments of Emotion-
ally Evocative Evidence, 13 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L., 110, 192 (2006) and Joel D. Lieberman
& Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explana-
tions for the Failures of Instructions To Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evi-
dence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677–79 (2000)).
333. Id.
334. See id. at 268.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 254.
337. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1988).
338. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
339. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 940–41 (10th Cir. 2013).
341. 736 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 2013).
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charges.342  The Tenth Circuit analyzed whether: (1) the evidence was
offered for a proper purpose; (2) it was relevant; (3) its probative
value was outweighed by unfair prejudice; and, finally, (4) a limiting
instruction was given.343  The court found that “[b]ecause the district
court gave a limiting instruction and the prior conviction meets the
requirements of the Rules 401, 403, and 404(b), the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence.”344  Additionally,
the court noted that “absent a showing to the contrary, we ‘presume
jurors will conscientiously follow the trial court’s instructions.’”345
This reliance is clearly misplaced.
Similarly, in United States v. Hearn,346 the Seventh Circuit stated
that “limiting instructions ‘are effective in reducing or eliminating any
possible unfair prejudice form the introduction of Rule 404(b) evi-
dence.’”347  The court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by admitting 404(b) evidence because a limiting instruction
was given.348 Brooks and Hearn are perfect examples of how applying
a checklist style test induces a mere automatic admission of this evi-
dence.349  As long as the evidence fits the criteria, it will get in.  This is
not what the Supreme Court intended in Huddleston.  The new rules-
based approach refocuses the issue on whether the evidence is
relevant.
C. By Refocusing on Relevancy, the Mere Automatic Admission
Effect Is Foreclosed
This new change in the law is important because it forecloses the
mere automatic admission effect.  The prior checklist approach al-
lowed the admission of other crimes evidence under 404(b) as long as
it met a checklist, and, in some cases, the evidence was admitted to
prove issues that were not necessarily relevant.350  For example, in
Miller, the defendant’s defense was that the marijuana was not his.351
Nonetheless, the prosecution admitted his prior convictions to prove
342. Id. at 926.
343. Id. at 939–41.
344. Id. at 941.
345. Id. (quoting United States v. Cardinas Garcia, 596 F.3d 788, 798 (10th Cir. 2010)).
346. 736 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 2013).
347. Id. at 713 (quoting United States v. Jones, 389 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545
U.S. 1125 (2005)).
348. Id.
349. United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 940–41 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Hearn,
534 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2008), on rehearing 549 F.3d 680.
350. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697–700 (7th Cir. 2012).
351. Id. at 696.
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intent to distribute.352  If the Seventh Circuit had applied the prior
four-part checklist, the court would have found the evidence to be
admissible as it satisfied the checklist.  Instead, by rejecting the old
approach, the Seventh Circuit refocused the issue on relevancy.353
Here, the issue of intent was not highly probative because the defen-
dant’s defense was that the drugs were not his.354  This new approach
puts an end to cases in which 404(b) evidence comes in to prove, for
example, intent when the defense has nothing to do with intent as
illustrated in Miller.  Refocusing the issue on relevancy gives a new
life to Rule 403 in the 404(b) analysis.
The new test changes the analysis for both the proponent of the
evidence and the court. The proponent must articulate a propensity-
free reasoning.  The court can no longer rationalize that a limiting in-
struction negates error.  This change in the law is important because it
furthers the standards of a fair trial, which is why all circuits must
adopt this standard and begin the inquiry with the sole purpose
standard.
V. CONCLUSION
The new test advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Gomez radically
changed the way the courts assess the admissibility of Rule 404(b)
other crimes evidence because the court changed the existing law.  Al-
though the new test continues to ignore the sole purpose test, the test
is still consistent with the broader holding of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Huddleston, and it better effectuates those concerns.355  The re-
quirement of providing a propensity-free line of reasoning to admit
other crimes evidence reduces the reliance on limiting instructions,
which are not inherently reliable in the first place.356  Therefore, be-
cause all federal circuit courts of appeals have differing tests, the re-
maining circuits should uniformly apply the new test as to ensure
fairness and accuracy.  In addition, the rules-based framework should
be modified to begin with the sole purpose standard derived from
352. Id.
353. See id. at 699.
354. See id.
355. See supra notes 238–71 and accompanying text (explaining that the new test is still within R
the holding of Huddleston as it reflects an approach grounded in the Rules of Evidence).
356. See supra notes 315–48 and accompanying text (describing the negative aspects of limit- R
ing instructions, including that it causes jurors to focus on the inadmissible evidence).
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Huddleston.357   After all, fundamental fairness is at the root of the
U.S. legal system.
Antonia M. Kopec´*
357. See supra notes 291–92 (discussing the importance of incorporating the sole purpose
standard with the rules-based approach at the very beginning).
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